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Richard W. Hompesch II
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Montana Administrative Proce-
dure Act' (MAPA) in 1971, administrative law decisions continue
to represent a small but vital part of the Montana Supreme
Court's calendar. The cases that do reach the supreme court con-
tinue to have a substantial impact on the interaction between state
agencies and residents. This survey contains the more important
Montana Supreme Court decisions from the years 1981 and 1982
which directly construe MAPA. Cases involving substantive ad-
ministrative law have been excluded.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONTESTED CASES
A. The Hearing Requirement
Under Montana law "[a] person who has exhausted all admin-
istrative remedies available within the agency and is aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review .... 2
A contested case is defined as "any proceeding before an agency in
which a determination of legal rights, duties, privileges of a party
is required by law to be made after an opportunity for hearing.' '
Selon v. Board of Personnel Appeals4 involved the state De-
partment of Administration's (DOA) appeal of a decision made by
the Board of Personnel Appeals (BPA). The district court dis-
missed the petition for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction. On
appeal the supreme court affirmed the dismissal. The court held
1. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101 to -711 (1981).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702(1)(a) (1981).
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(4) (1981) (emphasis added). The phrase "required by
law... has broader meaning than merely a statutory requirement for an opportunity for
hearing. It includes situations where a hearing is required as a matter of constitutional
right." MONT. CODE ANN § 2-4-102 (1981) comments.
4. - Mont. , 634 P.2d 646 (1981).
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that DOA was not entitled to judicial review because the "final or-
der of the BPA was not a final order in a contested case. It was not
a determination made after an opportunity for a hearing. '
The case began when Selon filed a complaint with BPA chal-
lenging the wage and classification of his position as office clerk
with the Department of Highways.6 The Montana Public Employ-
ees Association (MPEA) represented Mr. Selon. Three of the four
steps of BPA's grievance procedure were followed.7 DOA and
MPEA then agreed to follow an alternative grievance procedure in
order to facilitate the appeal before BPA. The appeal continued
according to the agreed procedure and BPA's preliminary decision
approved Selon's claim. DOA was notified on November 14, 1979
of BPA's preliminary decision to reclassify Selon's position at a
higher grade. On December 5, DOA mailed to BPA its exceptions
to BPA's preliminary decision. BPA disregarded DOA's exceptions
and adopted the preliminary decision as its final order.
The Selon decision turns on BPA's ruling that DOA's excep-
tions were not timely filed. Under the terms of the alternative
grievance procedure "any hearing would be limited in scope to the
issues presented and the filed exceptions."8 The supreme court
reasoned that DOA was not entitled to a hearing under the terms
of the agreement since the exceptions were untimely filed and
since the scope of the hearing was limited to the filed exceptions.'
The opinion may be criticized as being harsh from DOA's per-
spective. DOA never did obtain judicial review of whether DOA's
exceptions were timely filed or not.'0 The case illustrates that the
hearing requirement has crucial importance and that parties may
consent to an administrative procedure other than that required
by law.
B. Regulation Creating Right to Judicial Review
In Nye v. Department of Livestock," the supreme court af-
firmed a district court denial of a petition for judicial review of a
5. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 648.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-18-1011(1) (1981) states that "[a]n employee or his represen-
tative affected by the operation of parts 1 through 3 of [Title 2, Chapter 18] is entitled to
file a complaint with the board of personnel appeals provided for in 2-15-1705 and to be
heard under the provisions of a grievance procedure to be prescribed by the board."
7. BPA's four step grievance procedure is set forth in MONT. ADMIN. R. § 24.26.508
(1981).
8. Selon, - Mont. - , 634 P.2d at 648.
9. Id.
10. See infra note 2.
11. - Mont. - , 639 P.2d 498 (1982).
[Vol. 44
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decision to terminate the employment of a Department of Live-
stock employee. The case involved the petition of a permit clerk
for the Department who was promoted to a higher position. Ac-
cording to department policy the promotion placed Nye in proba-
tionary status for six months. During the period of probation,
Nye's supervisors determined that her performance was deficient
and they terminated her employment. Nye invoked the depart-
ment's grievance procedure to challenge the termination of her em-
ployment. A committee was formed and after a hearing took place
the committee recommended that Nye should be reinstated in her
previous position. The director of the department, however, disre-
garded the committee's recommendation.
Judicial review was denied in Nye on two grounds. First, the
case is not a "contested case"'" under MAPA, because an "oppor-
tunity for hearing' ' i was not "required by law" 4 before a decision
could be made to terminate Nye's employment. Second, the De-
partment's regulation which provided for judicial review was inva-
lid.15 The regulation stated that "[tihose grievances not allowed re-
dress with the aforementioned [review bodies] may pursue it at the
district court level.""' The court held that the Department could
not itself create a right of judicial review; only the legislature has
the power to provide for judicial review.1
7
C. Statute of Limitations and Judicial Review
In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court granted a rehearing of
Rierson v. State.' Rierson illustrates how the statute of limita-
tions operates on severable claims for relief when one of the causes
is adjudicated by an agency. In effect, the court stated that the
statute of limitations is tolled on severable claims while one of the
claims is being resolved through administrative procedure. I" How-
ever, the court also stated that the statute of limitations again be-
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-102(4) (1981).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 2.21.8008(4) (1981). The Department of Livestock adopted per-
sonnel regulations originally promulgated by the Department of Administration.
16. Id.
17. Nye, - Mont. -, 639 P.2d at 500. The court cites MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4,
cl. 2, which states that: "[tihe legislature may provide for direct review by the district court
of decisions of administrative agencies."
18. __ Mont. -, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980), af'd on rehearing, - Mont. __, 622
P.2d 195 (1981). For a detailed discussion of the original appeal see Survey, Administrative
Law, 42 MONT. L. REV. 329, 311-32 (1981).
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gins to run upon final decision by the agency.20
In Rierson, the statute of limitations began when appellant re-
tired from the State Highway Patrol. Nearly two years later Rier-
son's attorney sent a letter to the Board of Administration of the
Public Employees Retirement System demanding an adjustment of
Rierson's retirement benefits.2 1 An administrative proceeding was
formally requested by Rierson and a hearing was held before an
examiner. The Board adopted the hearing examiner's proposed de-
cision which denied Rierson any additional retirement benefits.
Within thirty days after the proposed decision was adopted, appel-
lant's attorney filed a petition for judicial review in state district
court.2 2 The Board did not receive notice of the petition until six-
teen and one-half months after the original petition had been filed,
when the Board was served with a summons and an amended peti-
tion. On motion by the Board, the district court dismissed the orig-
inal and amended petition as required under Montana Code Anno-
tated section 2-4-702(1)(a) (1981).2 The supreme court ruled that
the words "promptly served" required "service of the petition for
judicial review within thirty days or thereabouts. 2 4 The court held
that the sixteen and one-half month delay of service to the Board
after filing in district court was neither reasonable nor prompt.
2 5
Rierson's rehearing was based on the contention that the dis-
trict court failed "to treat his petition for judicial review as an in-
dependent civil action to which the 'prompt service' requirement
would not apply. '2' Rierson argued that his claim was severable
20. Id.
21. The dispute surfaced in 1971 when the administration of the highway patrol re-
tirement system was moved from the Highway Patrolman's Retirement Board [hereinafter
cited as HPRB] to the Board of Administration of the Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem [hereinafter cited as the Board]. Before 1971, HPRB determined that a patrolman with
over twenty-five years of service would receive retirement benefits exceeding one-half of
regular pay. The Board interpreted HPRB's determination to be in violation of MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 31-209 and § 31-213 (1947). On April 21, 1972 the Board adopted its interpre-
tation as policy. The interpretation was applied prospectively and highway patrolmen retir-
ing after April 21 could not receive greater than half pay regardless if they had worked over
twenty-five years. Rierson retired on April 4, 1974 with over twenty-five years of service.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-703(2)(a) (1981) states that:
"[p]roceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in district court
within 30 days after service of the final decision thereon. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute, the petition shall be filed in the district court for the county
where the petitioner resides or has his principal place of business or where the
agency maintains its principal office. Copies of the petition shall be promptly
served upon the agency and all parties of record."
23. Id.
24. Rierson (I), - Mont. - , 614 P.2d at 1024.
25. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 1023.
26. Rierson (II), - Mont. - , 622 P. at 197.
308 [Vol. 44
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and that the agency lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
severable claims. Therefore, his failure to "promptly serve" the
agency should not limit his district court action based on the sev-
erable claims which the agency lacked jurisdiction to hear.27
In a three to two decision, the Montana Supreme Court held
that even if Rierson's district court claim was an independent civil
action, his claim was barred because the statute of limitations had
expired.28 Retirement benefits are personal property rights and
therefore are subject to the two-year statute of limitations.29 Rier-
son's case accrued when he retired, and one year, three hundred
sixty days elapsed before his attorney demanded that his retire-
ment benefits be adjusted. The supreme court reasoned that the
statute of limitations again commenced when the proposed deci-
sion was adopted.30 Rierson filed his district court claim twenty-
five days after the board's adoption of the decision, twenty days
too late.
The Rierson rehearing decision contains two major points.
First, the supreme court has held that retirement benefits are per-
sonal property rights and are subject to a two-year statute of limi-
tations."1 The second and more important point is that although
27. Id. Justice Sheehy's dissent in Rierson's original appeal characterized Rierson's
claim as one that included a claim adjudicable by the administrative agency, namely that
Rierson was entitled to credit toward his retirement for the time he worked over twenty-five
years. Rierson's "independent civil action" was based on the two severable claims which
were: (1) that the Board had tortiously misled him into working beyond twenty-five years
by promising that the additional work years would be credited to his retirement; and
(2) that Rierson was deprived of due process and equal protection under the laws.
The Board had exceeded its rule making and interpretative powers since it did not have
the power to decide a tort claim against itself nor did it have the power to decide constitu-
tional issues. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702(1)(a) (1981) states that:
A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the
agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to
judicial review under the chapter. This section does not limit utilization of or the
scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or
trial de novo as provided by statute.
Justice Sheehy reasoned, therefore, that Rierson's failure to promptly serve the agency
could not limit Rierson's right of judicial review of the severable causes outside the agency's
subject matter jurisdiction. Rierson, - Mont. - , 614 P.2d at 1025 (Sheehy, J.,
dissenting).
28. Rierson, - Mont. - , 622 P.2d at 198.
29. Id. at -, 622 P.2d at 197-98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-207(1) (1979) states that
"[w]ithin 2 years is the period prescribed for the commencement of an action for injury to
personal property."
30. Id. at -, 622 P.2d at 198.
31. Justices Sheehy and Daly did agree with the majority that Rierson's tort claim
would have been barred by the statute of limitations. However, the Justices would hold
"that the pension dispute grows out of the relationship of master and servant which is con-
tractual in nature, and that either the five-year or eight-year period applies under Mont.
Code Ann. § 27-2-202 (1981)." Rierson, - Mont. - , 622 P.2d at 199. Ironically, the
5
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Montana Code Annotated section 2-4-702(2)(a) (1981) allows
thirty days for an appeal of an agency decision, the statute of limi-
tations on severable claims runs concurrently within that thirty-
day period. 2 Apparently the supreme court did not want to allow
the statute of limitations to be extended by boot-strapping the
thirty days for appeal onto the original period of limitations.3
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In Barnicoat v. Commissioner of Department of Labor and
Industry,4 the appellant brought an action against the Commis-
sioner of the Department of Labor and Industry claiming a refund
of unemployment benefits that he had repaid the Department. Af-
ter being terminated from his employment at Boulder River School
and Hospital, appellant received $1,022 in unemployment benefits.
He also filed a grievance with his union which resulted in an award
of $1,004. He then repaid the State Employment Security Division
$1,000. Appellant's repayment prompted a reconsideration of his
claim by the division." The division determined that appellant
owed the division the entire $1,022 he had received as unemploy-
ment compensation and sent him a letter demanding the balance
of $22. The division's letter contained a notice of appeal provi-
sion. 6 Appellant did not file an appeal, nor did he request a rede-
majority's position was supported by Rierson's attorney in his letter received by the Board
on March 18, 1976 which stated that "a suit will be filed no later than April 9, 1976" and
that "[t]ime is of the essence in that the statute of limitations is about to run on this mat-
ter." Id. at __, 622 P.2d at 197.
32. Id. at - , 622 P.2d at 198.
33. Id. The members of the court felt that "[tihe entire history of this case is one of
neglect and procrastination" and that "the appellant, from beginning to end, slept on his
rights." Id. Rierson knew of the Board's interpretation of his retirement benefits by June 20,
1972. Until his retirement two years later he did nothing to seek a remedy. An additional
two years passed until he requested a hearing. At the hearing Rierson's attorney was asked
to submit a brief by August 9, 1976. The deadline passed and the Board notified Rierson's
attorney that a decision would be reached with or without the brief. On March 11, 1977, the
brief was finally submitted. After the petition for judicial review was filed no action was
taken on the claim nor was the agency served until sixteen and one-half months later when
Rierson's attorney filed and served an amended complaint.
34. - Mont. - , 653 P.2d 498 (1982).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-2404(2) (1981) states that: "[t]he deputy may for good
cause reconsider his decision. .. "
36. The Division's standard notice of appeal provides that:
"[a]ny claimant or employer who believes that the decision of a Claims Examiner
is contrary to the law or the facts, may request a redetermination from the Claim
Examiner, or may appeal from his decision through a local office of the commis-
sion, requesting a review and stating the reasons therefor. Appeals must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of this notification or within seven (7) days after
notification is mailed."
Barnicoat, - Mont. -, 653 P.2d at 499.
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termination of the deputy's decision. 7 He did, however, sue the
division and his complaint was dismissed.
The supreme court affirmed the district court and held that
Barnicoat had ignored the "general principle that if an administra-
tive remedy is provided by statute, that relief must be sought from
the administrative body and the statutory remedy exhausted
before relief can be obtained by judicial review."s Barnicoat illus-
trates that a case such as this should not have been appealed to
the supreme court in the first place.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES
The validity of an agency's rules may be attacked in three
ways. One is through a declaratory judgment action in district
court. Another is by requesting a declaratory ruling from an
agency and then by seeking judicial review of the ruling. 40 The
third is by appealing the agency decision in a contested case pro-
ceeding.41 In the last two years, the Montana Supreme Court has
decided cases which utilize the latter two methods.
In Board of Barbers v. Big Sky College,42 respondents asked
the Board for a declaratory ruling regarding the question of
whether a graduate of Big Sky College could teach at the college
and thereby fulfill the one-year apprenticeship requirement for be-
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-2402(4) (1981) states that: "[a] determination or rede-
termination shall be deemed final unless an interested party entitled to notice thereof ap-
plies for reconsideration of the determination or appeals therefrom within 5 days after de-
livery of such notification or within 7 days after such notification was mailed to his last
known address, provided that such period may be extended for good cause." Barnicoat,
- Mont. - , 653 P.2d at 499.
38. State v. Giles, 168 Mont. 130, 132, 541 P.2d 355, 357 (1975). See also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-702(1)(a) (1981) which states that: "[a] person who has exhausted all administra-
tive remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a con-
tested case is entitled to judicial review .. " (emphasis added).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-506(5) (1981) states that a declaratory judgment "action
may be brought in district court .... " MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-506(1) states that "a rule
may be declared invalid ... if it is found that the rule or its threatened application inter-
feres with or impairs ... with the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff .... " MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-506(2) (1981) states that "a rule may also be declared invalid if it was adopted
with an arbitrary or capricious disregard for the purpose of the authorizing statute."
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-501 (1981) states that "[elach agency shall provide by rule
for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicabil-
ity of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency.... A declaratory ruling
or the refusal to issue such a ruling shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner as
decisions or orders in contested cases."
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702 (1981) entitled "Initiating Judicial Review of Con-
tested Cases" provides the means for judicial review of contested cases with a restriction
that a "party may not raise any other question not raised before the agency unless ... there
was good cause for failure to raise the question before the agency."
42. - Mont. -, 626 P.2d 1269 (1981).
7
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coming a licensed barber. 4 The Board ruled that the teaching ac-
tivity would count towards one-half of the apprenticeship require-
ment so long as another half year was obtained in a commercial
barber shop."" The Board's ruling was based on its regulation
which stated that: "Every apprentice must serve one normal work
year, or its equivalent at the discretion of the Board, as an appren-
tice before he can take the barber examination.' 5 Montana statu-
tory law defines an apprentice as "a person who receives instruc-
tion in an approved barber school or college and from a barber
authorized to practice barbering in the state."'
The district court held the Board's ruling invalid and the su-
preme court affirmed, stating that the ruling "engrafts an addi-
tional requirement on apprenticeship not contained in the stat-
ute.' 7 The statute required that the apprentice serve under the
supervision of a licensed barber for one year, but the Board's rul-
ing required that the apprentice serve a normal work year in a
"commercial barber shop."' 8
In McPhail v. Montana Board of Psychologists,9 a psycholo-
gist applied to the Montana Board of Psychologists for a license to
practice psychology. Statutory law at the time stated that a "li-
cense may be issued to an individual who has been a resident of
the State ... and who holds a master's degree... and in addition
has five years of professional experience. . .. -"5 The Board denied
McPhail the license based on the agency's rule that "applicants
who meet the qualificiations for licensure must have all five years of
qualified professional experience obtained after receiving a
master's degree . "..."51 McPhail did not have five years of experi-
ence after obtaining his master's degree.
McPhail petitioned the district court for review of his con-
tested case. The district court agreed with the Board's decision
based on the rule. The supreme court reversed and held that the
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-30-305 (1979) states that: "[o]n completion of one year of
apprenticeship under the immediate supervision of a licensed barber, an apprentice must
apply to the department to take the examination for a barber's certificate of registration."
The 1981 amendment to this section changed "one year" to "three months." See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 37-30-305 (1981).
44. Barbers, - Mont. - , 626 P.2d at 1270.
45. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 40-3.18(6)-S1860 (1981).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-30-101(2) (1981).
47. Barbers, - Mont. -, 626 P.2d at 1271.
48. Id. at -, 626 P.2d at 1270.
49. - Mont. -, 640 P.2d 906 (1982).
50. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-3208(4) (1947).
51. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 40-3.90(6)-S90090(2)(f) MAC (1971).
312 [Vol. 44
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rule was "out of harmony" with the statute.52 The rule engrafted a
contradictory requirement on the statute because the statute re-
quired five years experience and a master's degree while the rule
required the experience after the degree was obtained.
McPhail and Board of Barbers are indicative of the supreme
court's adherence to a previously articulated test used to deter-
mine when agency regulations should be invalidated. In McPhail,
the supreme court stated that administrative regulations are "out
of harmony" with legislative guidelines if they (1) "engraft addi-
tional and contradictory requirements on the statute" '54 or (2) "if
they engraft additional non-contradictory requirements on the
statute which were not envisioned by the legislature. 55 This two
prong test is an interpretation of Montana statutory law which
states that "no rule adopted is valid or effective unless consistent
and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the statute."" McPhail and Board of
Barbers resolve any doubt about the importance of the "out of
harmony" tests. In the future these tests may be relied upon with
certainty to challenge the validity of administrative rules.
52. McPhail, - Mont. ., 640 P.2d at 907.
53. See Bell v. Dept. of Professional and Occupational Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 594
P.2d 331 (1979).
54. McPhail, - Mont. -, 640 P.2d at 908 (quoting State of Montana v. Casne,
172 Mont. 302, 308, 564 P.2d 983, 986 (1977)).
55. Id. (quoting Bell v. Department of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23, 594 P.2d 331, 333
(1979)).




Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1983
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/10
